Abstract: Recent advances in neuroscience have dramatically improved our understanding of human emotional states. With the help of new technologies and models, scholars are beginning to unravel the "mystery" of emotional life. Confusions in contemporary emotion studies are due to the traditional model of a person as a rational conscious agent.The paper highlights two problematic aspects of this prevailing model: the relation between emotion and reason and the relation between emotion and consciousness. Firstly, it is claimed that the difference between emotions and thoughts does not transcend their mutual interconnectivity. Secondly, conscious content and emotional responses are both products of specialized emotion systems that operate unconsciously. Both claims are supported by experimental findings and clinical practice.
Minds without emotions are like souls on ice-cold, lifeless creatures devoid of any desires, fears, sorrows, pains or pleasures. It is hard to disagree with these words of Joseph LeDoux, a leading authority in neural science. Feelings, fear, joy or sadness are inseparable from our everyday experiences. We seldom search for the "place" where our emotions come from. They seem to appear suddenly, they can change slowly, one moment we may feel happy and the next we may start crying. Thus, it seems that emotions come and go "as they like" without our willful participation. So far so good. But sometimes it is not easy to explain what is and what is not consistent with our commonsense intuitions about our ongoing emotional states. The ability to "read" the minds of others, empathize with them, feel angry at them, predict their behaviour and actions makes us quite successful folk psychologists. However, a plausible theoretical approach to the study and explanation of emotions requires more. Scientists and philosophers aim to provide a systematic account of what emotions are, how they operate in the brain, and why they play such an important role in our lives. Paradoxically, the cognitive science that flourished in the second half of the twentieth century ignored emotions both in practice and in theory. Cognitive scientists began studying cognitive states of mind independently of emotions. Research has concentrated primarily on answering questions about how we think, solve problems, perceive and control our actions, remember facts, and so on. Since the decline of the behaviorist era it has become popular to approach the mind as the function of a system. Fascinated by the metaphor of the computer, cognitive scientists and philosophers have created a new cognitive-computer picture of the mind. Heterogeneous mental states were approached from the perspective of an interconnected input-information processing-output diagram. For decades study of cognition was hampered by the dominance of functionalism in philosophy and psychology. The artificial separation of emotions in cognitive science in the early days of the cognitive revolution made an important contribution to both experimental and theoretical inquiry and helped to establish a new approach to the mind. But, soon it became evident that the human mind is a rather specifically engineered feeling machine with a rich evolutionary history. Inspired by new discoveries in neuroscience, evolutionary theory, psychology and anthropology, scholars began to reconsider their attitudes to the proclaimed mysterious "inner world" and started searching for new levels of analysis, hypotheses and research programs. The problematic nature of emotions has been expressed in questions such as the following: What is the relation between emotions, thoughts and will? Are emotions innate? What does it mean to have the capacity for self-control? Are we responsible for our actions, volitions, decisions? Why is it important to unfold the neuronal mechanisms of emotional states? Do comatose patients feel? Where do feelings come from? What are conscious emotions for?
As the contemporary state of field suggests, there is no single general approach or theory of emotions. Scientists and theoreticians are confronted instead with a collection of various psychological phenomena closely related to the problems of the nature of the mind, free will, consciousness and overall behaviour. The complex and interdisciplinary nature of any proposed research on emotion thus represents a great challenge for scholars of various disciplines.
In the following article, I intend to highlight two problematic aspects of emotion studies: firstly, the relation between reason and emotion; and secondly, misunderstandings concerning emotions and the conscious/unconscious dichotomy.
Reason and/or Passion
Confusion about the nature of emotion has a long tradition in philosophy, psychology and neuroscience. In the traditional model of a person, the role of emotions in the overall picture of human behaviour was underestimated. Having control over one's actions presupposes that one acts as a maximally rational conscious agent with the emotions having a minimal impact. Since the time of the ancient Greeks, theoreticians have found it compelling to separate reason from passion, thinking from feeling, cognition from emotion. Passions have mostly been considered as inherited from our animal predecessors. Plato placed emotions within his broad conception of the mind based on the distinction between reasoning, desiring and feeling. For him passions, desires and fears are seen to be a kind of "enemy" of thinking. Emotions were analogous to wild horses to be reined in by the intellect, which he thought of as a charioteer. For Plato this picture represented the struggle between passions and the intellect, the rational part of the soul which was identified with wisdom. René Descartes analysed in detail emotions such as anger, happiness, fear, love, anxiety in his treatise Passions of the Soul. Passions represented the "perceptions, feelings, emotions of the soul which we relate specially to it and which are caused, maintained and fortified by some movement of the spirits" (Descartes 1967, 344) . He characterized the struggle between body and soul as a war of the volitional soul against passions and bodily processes. The moral of Descartes' approach encouraged the use of experience and reason in such a way as to avoid zeal. Reason is supposed to prevent the soul from being wholly able to control its passion. Knowledge of the nature and functions of passions is thus a necessary prerequisite in controlling passions and acting rightly towards others. This conception, based on firm and determinate judgements respecting the knowledge of good and evil in man's life had a fundamental influence on the psychology and physiology of the time.
David Hume's philosophical tradition has been less generous to emotions, which were treated as realms of animal and flesh. Immanuel Kant analysed the concept of soul (freedom, god) independently from experience, as an unempirical idea of reason. A man is able to act morally only when he is free, when his will is unconstrained and acts "within itself". The morality of an act is in Kant's conception closely related to the war against the sensational "natural" in man. The role of the critic of practical reason is to avoid pretensions of empirically determined reason to become a genuine determinative of will. Kant's moral categorical imperative is considered the activity of "pure will" and "pure reason".
By the end of the nineteenth century Darwin, James and Freud had written extensively on emotions and given emotion a privileged place in the science of the mind and behaviour. (1872) emphasized the unity of expressing emotions in humans independently of their culture and also the continuity of expressing emotions in animals and humans. He observed that human facial expressions are sometimes homologous with those of primates. Darwin's identification of several expressions of emotions-happiness, joy, fear, sadness, anger, surprise and disgust as pan-cultural is still recognized. Ethological tradition emphasized the inheritance of complex behaviour patterns in humans and in a similar vein attributed an adaptive value to emotions. In his work, the famous ethologist Konrad Lorenz revived Darwinian ideas at a time when behaviorist theory and practice were widespread. William James proposed that conscious emotional feeling is the perception of automatic nervous system changes caused by external stimuli via a reflex arc. His ideas influenced the work of a leading contemporary neuroscientist, Antonio Damasio, who enriched theories on emotions with a new inspirational perspective. Data from neurobiological studies demonstrated a close connection between thinking and feeling. The relevancy of feeling within decision making has been often illustrated by the classical case of Phineas Gage (Damasio 1994) . Severe brain damage to specific areas of both prefrontal lobes had an immense impact on the personality of Pineas. Gradually, he lost the ability to decide, plan and find a permanent job. His impairment led to a total emotional breakdown, social isolation and loss of personality.
Charles Darwin in his work The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals
Treating thoughts and feelings as interconnected, surely, does not imply that they do not differ. For Joseph LeDoux conscious emotional feelings and conscious thoughts are in some sense similar. They both involve the symbolic representation in working memory of subsymbolic processes carried out by systems that work unconsciously. The difference between them is due to the fact that a) emotional feelings and thoughts are generated by different subsymbolic systems, and b) emotional feelings involve many more brain systems than thoughts (LeDoux 1998, 299) . Emotions create a flurry of activity devoted to one goal while thoughts do not. We can easily daydream while doing other things-reading, eating and so on. But, when faced with danger or challenging emotional situations we do not have time to kill, for example, the whole self becomes absorbed in the emotion itself.
The word "emotion" does not refer, according to LeDoux, to something that the mind or the brain really has or does; it is more a convenient way of talking about aspects of the brain and its mind. Various classes of emotions are mediated by separate neural systems that have evolved for different reasons. There is no such thing as an "emotion" faculty and neither is there a single brain system dedicated to it. Brain systems that generate emotional behaviour have been conserved through many levels of evolutionary history. All animals, including people, have to satisfy certain conditions to survive in the world and fulfill their biological imperative of passing their genes on to their offspring. Insects, worms, fish, birds, rats and people need to obtain food and shelter, protect themselves from bodily harm and procreate. The neural organization of particular behavioral systems (such as the systems underlying fearful, sexual or feeding behaviors) is quite similar across species. Brains are not the same, but understanding what it means to be human involves an appreciation of the ways in which we are like other animals as well as the ways in which we are different.
The Brain Knows more than the Conscious Mind Reveals
As emotional beings we think of emotions as conscious experiences. When we try to understand, for example, love or what a feeling is, why it occurs, where it comes from, the subjective feeling itself does not have much to do with it. We are not primarily interested in what it is like for an individual to feel, as some philosophers have recently claimed (Chalmers 1996) . Their work is based on the idea that the "hard problem" in explaining the human mind and consciousness lies in the very phenomenon of subjective feeling, in the way we consciously experience, feel our inner states and surroundings. However, experimental researches, clinical practice, the study of impairments of the conscious mind suggest that the generation of emotional responses does not require, for the most part, the presence of consciousness. Subjective emotional states, like all states of consciousness, are the result of information processing occurring unconsciously (LeDoux 1998, 37). Damasio made this clear when he wrote emotions are things that "happen to us rather than things we will to occur" (Damasio 1999, 19) . That is also why he considers the feeling of feelings, identified with consciousness, to be only the tip of the mental iceberg. But, once emotions occur they become powerful motivators of future behaviours. Besides being useful, they can also have pathological consequences. As a number of case studies show, mental problems reflect a breakdown of emotional order.
In his approach to consciousness, Damasio emphasizes the unity of states of consciousness, the self and emotions. Emotions are associated with one type of (evolutionary older) consciousness, namely core consciousness. Patients whose core consciousness is impaired do not reveal emotion though facial expression, body expression or vocalization. The emotional life is lacking in its entirety. Another type of impairment shows that patients with, for example, a preserved core consciousness but impaired extended consciousness have normal background and primary emotions. The fact that the "biological machinery underlying emotion is not dependent on consciousness" (Damasio 1999, 43) is best illustrated by the following case study. Due to extensive damage to both temporal lobes (and the hippocampus and amygdala) David, a young man, was unable to learn a single new fact. Surprisingly, David seemed to manifest preferences for certain persons and avoided others even though he could not recognize any of them. Damasio conducted research into this area and designed a good-guy/bad-guy experiment. David engaged in three distinct types of human interaction: a) extremely pleasant, b) emotionally neutral and c) bad mannered, boring. First type of interaction was with someone who was extremely pleasant and welcoming. Second interaction involved somebody who was emotionally neutral and third type of interaction involved an individual whose manner was brusque, who would not say no to any request. David's exposure to the good, to the bad, and to the indifferent was measured and compared. Then David was asked to look at sets of four photographs that included the face of one of the three individuals in the experiment, his task was to identify a friend among them. David chose a) over 80% of the time, b) chosen with a probability of a chance and c) bad guy was almost never chosen (in reality a pretty young woman!). The experiment demonstrated that when core consciousness remains intact, the nonconscious preference of a patient's brain can generate actions commensurate with the emotional value (Damasio 1999, 45 ). The experiment not only supported the plausibility of dividing consciousness into more evolutionary evolved types but also contributed to an understanding of the complexity of relations between emotions, conscious feelings and brain activity.
One may be happy or nervous and yet be at a loss to explain why this or that particular state happens. Emotional feelings do not come from nowhere; their substrate is a set of neural patterns in maps of selected structures. Animals, like humans, can solve a number of problems without being conscious of what, how and why they do so. Consciousness elevates thinking to a new level, but it is not the same thing as thinking. Emotional feelings result when we become consciously aware that the emotion system of the brain is active. The transformation from emotion to conscious feeling is a complex journey. Damasio recognizes at least five steps from emotion to feeling to feeling of feeling (Damasio 1999, 283) . When emotional systems function in an animal that also has the capacity for conscious awareness, conscious emotional feelings occur. We know that we have an emotion when a sense of the feeling of self is created in our minds, until this self appears well-orchestrated responses exist, which constitute an emotion, or brain representations which constitute a feeling.
The problematic nature of the conscious/unconscious divide is closely connected with a popular but at the same time theoretically controversial phenomenon of pain. Pain is a consequence of the state of local dysfunction in living tissue-tissue damage causes the sensation of pain but it also causes regulatory responses such as reflexes and may also induce emotions on its own (Damasio 1999, 71) . Provided that there is consciousness, then we can become aware of pain and realise that we are experiencing an emotion associated with it. If you pick up a hot plate and burn the skin on your fingers you experience pain and might even suffer. What has happened can be put in neurobiological terms as follows: the heat activated a large number of thin and unmyelinated nerve fibers, C-fibers near the burn. Then, the heat destroyed several thousand skin cells and this released a number of chemical substances in the area. Several classes of white blood cell that repair tissue damage were called to the area, a number of chemicals activated nerve fibres on their own, adding their voices, signals, to that of the heat itself. Once the activation wave had started in the nerve fibers it travelled to the spinal cord and a chain of signals was produced across several neurons and synapses. As a result of the succession of signals, the neurons were temporally activated, producing a neural pattern-the conditions required to generate the sensation of pain had been met. Knowing that you have a pain requires something else, which occurs after the neural patterns that correspond to the substrate of pain (nociceptive signals) are displayed in the appropriate areas of the brain stem, thalamus, and cerebral cortex and generate an image of pain, a feeling of pain. It is a brain process that interrelates neural patterns of tissue damage with the neural patterns that represent you such that another neural pattern can arise-of you knowing, which, according to Damasio, is just another name for consciousness. If this latter process does not take place, you will never know that there was tissue damage to your organism.
A vast number of emotional responses are generated automatically producing changes in facial expression and posture along with changes in heart rate and control of blood circulation. For instance, many such responses are present in comatose patients in whom consciousness is suspended. The state of their nervous system can be evaluated by establishing whether the patient reacts to unpleasant stimuli with facial and limb movements. Even if the importance of the above mentioned research for further diagnosis and therapy is evident, plenty of unanswered ethical, legal and social questions remain (Illess 2006) . We can see that contrary to our everyday intuitions and also to traditional philosophical conceptions, pain and emotion are not the same thing. A case study of a patient in whom there was dissociation between pain as such and emotion caused by pain makes this clear. The patient was suffering from a severe case of refractory trigeminal neuralgia-tic douloureux. This condition affects the nerve that supplies signals indicating sensation in the face, so that even innocent stimuli such as a light touching of the skin, trigger excruciating pain. Two days after the patient had undergone surgery, Damasio visited the patient. He realized that the patient had become an entirely different more relaxed person and when asked about the pain he replied: "the pains were the same, but I do not feel them". So, the operation had eliminated the emotional reactions that the sensory patterns of tissue dysfunction had been engendering. The suffering had gone.
Summary
To claim that emotions represent a fundamental aspect of human life is a commonplace. Explaining and understanding their nature is not so straightforward. So far, experimental and theoretical research has revealed new mechanisms and principles which condition the activity of numerous emotional states. Problems attributing the proper place of emotions in our mental life and the search for an appropriate methodology have been reflected in a number of models, and cognitive and noncognitive theories. In giving insight into how the most personal aspects of our mind work, a scientific understanding of emotions could help us understand what may go wrong when this part of our mental life breaks down.
Research in neuroscience, neuropsychology and cognitive science together with new technologies has also brought new insights in investigating and understanding the relation between reason and emotions. As recent studies have shown, emotions play an important part in practical decision making, while the strict dichotomy between the "feeling heart" and "cold reason" has unquestioningly been abandoned. The existence of an entity called "pure reason" is also an illusion, since most goal-formatting, problem-solving and planning includes a variety of cognitive-emotional features. The substantial presence and role of unconscious states in human decisions, planning and acting have undermined traditional ideas on conscious states. Most traditional approaches to and conceptions of the emotions (reason, free will, consciousness) have thus been challenged. The human mind or emotional states are no longer considered immaterial "ghosts in a machine" or a threat to rationality. The lasting struggle between thought and emotion may very well be resolved soon by a harmonious integration of reason and passion in the brain.
Experimental research and clinical practice have demonstrated the need to reconsider the model of the rational conscious agent. It is evident that free action cannot be identified with conscious action, that will is far from being an inner unobjectifiable mental "entity". Understanding motives, causes and effects of action presupposes that what is being taken into account is a person's inclination towards irrational decisions, misunderstandings, and a number of cognitive biases grounded in either the underestimation or overestimation of the capacities of the mind. Theoreticans can no longer sweep new empirical and theoretical findings "under the carpet". In fact these findings may be helpful in clarifying the meaning and use of terms, in questioning superficial dichotomies and asking new questions. Dissolving the terminological fog which covers the concepts of consciousness, will, rationality, conscious/unconsious processes, volitional acts would play an important role in overcoming conceptual misunderstandings and strengthening the explanatory power of recent theories.
Finally, one has to admit that inner feelings are not easy to unravel. We may perhaps not need to change our image of the human being as a united body and soul. It will suffice if we are to once more see things in terms of the hippocratic tradition in which man's cognitive, emotional, volitional states and acts oscillate between health and disease. Viewing emotional beings from a diagnostic and therapeutic perspective can do justice to that which is crucial in life-the prevention of pain and emotional suffering.
